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Abstract
Although the inclusion of  the subjectivity of  the individual seems to be the principle 
of education today, the term „subjectivity” is understood in different ways, which gives 
rise to contradictory models of education. It happens so in the case of influential and 
contrary models of subjectivity, presented by the widely understood antipedagogy and 
Catholic personalism, which ascribe a strong connotation to it. The analysis of this prob-
lem in this article will determine the reflection on the understanding of subjectivity and 
the characteristics of postmodernity in this context. The aim of this article is to demon-
strate that personalism not only protects the subjectivity of the pupil but also does not 
give up education as it happens in antipedagogy. The role of personalistic education is, 
in no case, to underestimate the subjectivity of young people but to support the process 
of preferences and to affirm their proper hierarchy of values, without which their fullness 
of humanity will not materialize.
Keywords
Models of education, personalism, postmodernity.
1. Introduction
Over half a century ago, in a completely different socio-political context, H. Ar-
endt wrote about a crisis of education reflected in, e.g. a decline of authority 
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figures, particularly parents and educators.1 The reflection on the sense of dis-
cussing the education crisis calls for a separate discussion and is not related 
to the problem stated in the title of the present article. However, it is difficult 
not to discern that postmodernity brings about phenomena that seem to have 
a disturbing influence over our existence also in this area. The aspect that must 
be  indicated, first and foremost, is  the multifaceted crisis of: man, thinking, 
morality and finally what may be described as  the educational process. All 
these problems may constitute the subject of a very interesting intellectual 
analysis, and, from the perspective of philosophy of education, consideration 
of understanding of  subjectivity of pupils as determined by postmodernity, 
is  also an  interesting proposition. On  the one hand, taking the subjectivity 
of an individual into account appears as an unquestionable principle, even one 
of the factors constituting political correctness. On the other hand, however, 
it  is difficult to disregard the symptoms of the depreciation of this subjectiv-
ity on numerous levels. This contradiction is related to the ambiguity of the 
term “subjectivity” but also to the dichotomy of the declarative and real world 
in many areas.
Regardless of the fact whether the crisis of education of the beginning of the 
21st century is diagnosed, or the transformations occurring within it are con-
cerned, which may be evaluated in manifold ways, also positively, the correla-
tion between the educational situation and the subjectivity of persons creating 
it, is established beyond doubt. It is difficult to find a serious voice in the public 
discourse that would deny the relevance of subjectivity in education and opt 
for, e.g. returning to the traditional educational authoritarianism. Even a cur-
sory analysis of this subject area leads to a conclusion that this subjectivity 
may be interpreted in completely different ways, and even subtle divergences 
give rise to entirely discrepant models of education. It is true in the case of the 
prominent but opposing models of subjectivity, presented by the broadly-defined 
antipedagogy and Catholic personalism, both ascribing a strong connotation 
to it. The analysis of this problem undertaken in this article will determine the 
reflection on the understanding of subjectivity and the characteristics of post-
modernity, particularly personalism, in this context. The aim of this article is to 
demonstrate that personalism not only protects the subjectivity of the pupil but 
also does not abandon education, as it is in the case of antipedagogy.
 1 Cf. H. Arendt, La crise de la culture, Paris 1972, pp. 223-252.
Łukasz Brózda
Subjectivity in education in the sense of personalization 95
2. Existential context
Each epoch brings specific existential determinants, which not only dictate 
the way of thinking of people but also greatly influence the vision of man, the 
world and life in this world. The synergic interdependence of these factors 
should provoke to reflecting on this issue, also with regard to challenges that 
present-day man has to face. In spite of the fact that, particularly in the peda-
gogical context, the problem seems to lie in inadequate empirical research that 
would be well-correlated with the educational pragmatics, still, from the point 
of view of a theoretician, modern humanity, which is rather inclined to resign 
from thinking, needs to build foundations, which can be provided by the philo-
sophical consideration.
The philosophical analysis of aspects constituting the existential background 
of man at the beginning of the third millennium, while remaining complex, 
is not unambiguous and frequently assesses the same phenomena different-
ly. These problems are exacerbated with the growing conviction that we exist 
in a “fluid” reality,2 where we may observe an emergence of perspectives, the 
consequences of which cannot be fully verified. The changes, which are per-
ceived by some opinion leaders with hope, are seen by others as manifestations 
of a serious crisis, both on the individual and social plane. The amount of data 
that is available to everyone nowadays is characterized by such variety and 
complexity that it is possible to take advantage of it in order to give credence 
to extreme visions of reality. The postmodern man is driven by so many mo-
tives and affections that they cannot fully grasp, let alone be subject to any real 
or stricter control.3
The dispute over the assessment of the often-revolutionary transformations 
in the broadly-conceived morality must be regarded as the particularly clear 
 2 Cf. K. Kiciński, Orientacje moralne społeczeństwa polskiego, in: Kondycja moralna 
społeczeństwa polskiego, ed. J. Mariański, Kraków 2002, p. 375.
 3 Cf. R. Tarnas, Dzieje umysłowości zachodniej. Idee, które ukształtowały nasz światopogląd, 
(trans.) M. Filipczuk, J. Roszkowski, Poznań 2002, p. 466, 478; J. Stala, E. Osewska, Anders 
erziehen in Polen. Der Erziehungs- und Bildungsbegriff im Kontext eines sich ständig 
verändernden Europas des XXI. Jahrhunderts, Tarnów 2009, Polihymnia; Wychowanie 
a wyzwania ponowoczesności, ed. E. Osewska, Warszawa 2011, UKSW; Rodzina i edukacja 
w zmaganiu o przyszłość Europy, ed. E. Osewska, Tarnów 2016; J. Stala, W kierunku integralnej 
edukacji religijnej w rodzinie. Próba refleksji nad nauczaniem Jana Pawła II w kontekście 
polskich uwarunkowań, Tarnów 2010, Polihymnia; Religious Education / Catechesis in the 
Family. A European Perspective, eds. E. Osewska, J. Stala, Warszawa 2010, UKSW.
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and strong influence on man’s individual and social way of existing. Numer-
ous authors, especially those inspired by the Catholic doctrine, seem to be 
convinced that humanity is afflicted with a deep moral crisis, not indifferent 
towards the formulated educational concepts and understanding of subjectivity 
of individuals. The factors “responsible” for this crisis include, e.g. dominance 
of  materialistic anthropology negating spirituality;4 increasing consumer-
ism, stimulated by the media and even science; normative chaos; and, finally, 
an almost complete rejection of what morally “should be done”, related to the 
decline of authority figures.5 By radically opposing theses on the moral cri-
sis, thinkers of the postmodernist trend seem to be of the opinion that a new, 
better age of morality is approaching, since it is founded on the independence 
and responsibility of the individual. In their view, in the face of the increasing 
pluralism, the ethical universalism, postulated by e.g. Christianity, loses its 
raison d’être.6 Even if such claims were to be dismissed, it is, in fact, difficult 
not to admit that in the broadly-defined social pragmatics, these individuals 
become the sole creators of their life, also the moral one.
The rapidly changing new models of social life, which determine the under-
standing of subjectivity by affecting the form of relations of an individual towards 
other individuals and communities, are closely associated with transformations 
in the moral sphere. The phenomena typical for the turn of the second and 
third millennium: anomie of social ties and resignation from the social order-
ing of the world, do not create favorable conditions for building stronger social 
ties without which it is pointless to refer to subjectivity.7
In search of the cause of the modern “fixation” on the autonomy of an indi-
vidual and their independence, we must firstly point out the popularity of social 
models that opt for liberal individualism, characterized by an array of impli-
cations of varying importance. Thus, an individual is not perceived as a co-
participant and co-creator of social life, responsible for the good of their own 
as well as others’, but rather as an autotelic and completely perfect being that 
may actually do without others and be oriented around one’s own good.8 While 
 4 Cf. Jan Paweł II, Pamięć i tożsamość, Kraków 2005, p. 19.
 5 Cf. A. Szołtysek, Filozofia wychowania moralnego, Kraków 2009, p. 127.
 6 Cf. J. Mariański, Socjologia moralności, Lublin 2006, p. 45.
 7 Cf. Z. Bauman, Społeczeństwo w stanie oblężenia, Warszawa 2006, pp. 17-18.
 8 Cf. P. Skrzydlewski, Błąd antropologiczny w teoriach społecznych, in: Błąd antropologiczny, 
(eds.) A. Maryniarczyk, K. Stępień, Lublin 2003, pp. 245-246.
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being critical of this way of building inter-community relations of individuals, 
it must be mentioned that an alternative solution are often totalitarian systems 
of diverse provenance, which were dramatically “tested” in the 20th century, and 
are characterized by subordinating the good of an individual to society. These 
systems, disregarding an individual and often depriving them of their legitimate 
rights, in practice, do not function without violence. Under such circumstances, 
any kind of good contributed to a community by an individual is extorted from 
this individual by their community, or rather its authorities. There is no room 
here for dialogue or participation, characteristic for personal communities, but 
there emerge other aspects that practically destroy subjectivity: evasion and 
conformism.9
3. The phenomenon of subjectivity
While searching for their own identification, people have, for a long time, found 
it primarily in their reason. Ancient and medieval philosophers saw man, first 
and foremost, as a being who is, owing to their reason, capable of introspection 
and determination of the irrational world. Whereas the elements that seems 
to define the contemporary man, in great part, is not their rationality, but rather 
their volitional sphere, or even emotionality, although this issue may be a subject 
of a separate discussion. In the light of the above considerations, substantial 
appreciation of freedom becomes not only a consequence of exhibiting the 
inherent property of man, which is beyond any doubt, but also acknowledging 
it as a defining element of man. Modern philosophy of subject favors idealization 
of opposites: freedom – nature, spontaneity – necessity, authenticity – objectivity, 
and, in fact, it has abstracted freedom from the real human existence.10 “Re-
evaluation” of freedom, perceived as being in opposition to reason and regarded 
as a factor that overly objectifies man, is ascribed numerous consequences for the 
social, political and, finally, moral life. The present-day man, who greatly values 
their freedom, is reluctant to “compromises”, which appear to violate this free-
dom to some extent. While in the contexts that may be defined as economic, man 
is sometimes capable of maintaining this freedom, in terms of social relations, 
however, particularly with regard to morality, man seems to watch over it care-
 9 Cf. K. Wojtyła, Osoba i czyn, Kraków 1969, pp. 355-357.
 10 Cf. A. Wierzbicki, W ręku rady Jego, „Resovia Sacra” 1 (1994), p. 203.
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fully, frequently fetishizing it. The same remarks may be directed at education, 
which is a very delicate sphere of human life and which may be perceived as an 
end or, at the very least, a threat to freedom.11
The term “subjectivity” present in the title of this article may, today, be re-
garded as a correlate or even a synonym of human freedom. In the area of edu-
cation, as it is the case in issues related to politics or the social or religious life, 
subjectivity is becoming a quintessence of freedom of the individual. In the 
cultural area, the role of an individual in the social life is undoubtedly on the rise, 
what is more, awareness of one’s rights is growing even we had to concede the 
point that it frequently happens on the declarative level. The fact of subjectivity 
of: the school in relation to the country, the family to the school or the pupil 
to the factors determining the social space, is no longer, and rightly so, a matter 
of disputes. The concern for maintaining subjectivity, not always understood 
integrally, is, however, becoming something more: an axiom or a dogma, which 
is beyond any, even substantive, discussion.
The growing significance of subjectivity, also in  this area, is  influenced 
by a considerable area of underspecification and insolvability, which increases 
the need for human initiative and independence.12 Even though it is connected 
with some amount of discomfort, modern man is required to be creative and 
not to concede his right to make decisions to others. Under these circumstances, 
acknowledging the subjectivity of young people is becoming the foundation 
of education, a competence without which they will lose their place in the 
fluctuating reality.
Having indicated today’s explicit and common acceptance of the role of sub-
jectivity in the process of education, it must be noted that there are serious 
problems with regard to formulating its definition in a way to make it as uni-
versal and acceptable as possible. It seems, however, that the subjective man, 
by regulating his relations with the environment, ought to reject inertia and 
take advantage of their most fundamental attributes: reason and freedom. The 
possibility of affecting the broadly-defined surroundings must, thus, be regarded 
as a condition for the education acknowledging subjectivity of each individual 
making up the educational situation. The evaluation “criteria” for the subjectivity 
 11 Cf. J. Stala, Der Mensch als Person: Die bestimmende Grundlage für Johannes Paul II. 
in seinem Bild von der Familie, „The Person and the Challenges” 2 (2012) Nr 2, pp. 41-59; 
J. Stala, Die personalistische Grundlage für Erziehung und Bildung in der katholischen Schule, 
„Angelicum“ 88 (2011), pp. 997-1007.
 12 Cf. M. Szymański, Edukacyjne problemy współczesności, Kraków 2014, pp. 98-99.
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of the individual are: possessing and creatively modifying the conception of the 
world, justifying one’s role in it, as well as making choices in accordance with 
a defined value-system.13
In the strictly philosophical context, the implicative account of the term 
“subject” (hipokeimenon) must be one by Aristotle, who perceives it as something 
that is at the base of something, as the foundation for the occurrence of things 
and phenomena.14 What follows from that definition is recognizing subjec-
tivity as an elemental factor constituting the person and being the foundation 
for others. Every action negating one’s subjectivity by other persons or social 
institutions is to be regarded as an action depreciating the person and their 
inherent value.15
While addressing the issue of subjectivity of the individual, it must be men-
tioned that at the turn of the 20th and 21st century it was particularly emphasized 
by the supporters of antipedagogy, who have had significant influence over the 
functioning models of education. This trend enhances the status of participa-
tion in shaping the subjectivity of a child, based on partnership and solicitude, 
and deeply respecting that child’s autonomy. As a consequence of making the 
focal point of its assumptions such as elements as self-determination, freedom, 
one’s responsibility only for oneself, the purpose-oriented education is seen 
as a threat to the subjectivity of children and youth, or rather of all those that 
would be subjected to a more or less formalized education. By granting each 
man, regardless of his age, i.e. also children, the same rights as those for adults, 
it is assumed that every educational process characterized by a purpose does 
not, on principle, guarantee equal relations between pupils and educators, but, 
in fact, questions these rights. A pupil cannot be regarded as a being resem-
bling a puppet, which the educator attempts to orient in the chosen direction, 
but an autonomous subject making his own choices. In the light of the above 
 13 Cf. A. Warchoł, Podmiot w sferze społecznej, in: Podmiot, osoba, tożsamość, E. Pietrzak, 
A. Warchoł, Ł. Zaorski-Sikora, Łódź 2007, p. 37; E. Osewska, The Current Situation of Education 
and Continuing Professional Development of RE Teachers in Poland in the Context of the 
Social Challenges, “The Person and the Challenges” 2 (2012) Nr 2, pp. 123-131; E. Osewska, 
The Catholic School in the Context of Growing Migration into Europe, “The Person and the 
Challenges” 5 (2015) Nr 2, pp. 79-90; E. Osewska, Religious Education as Accompanying: from 
Superficiality to Spirituality to Personal Acquaintance with God Incarnate, ”The Person and 
the Challenges“ 6 (2016) Nr 2, pp. 21-34; E. Osewska, Memories of Adults Regarding Relations 
with Parents in Childhood, ”The Person and the Challenges“ 7 (2017) Nr 1, pp. 149-158.
 14 Cf. K. Leśniak, Arystoteles, Warszawa 1989, pp. 75-76.
 15 Cf. K. Wojtyła, Osoba i czyn, Kraków 1969, pp. 122-127.
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assumptions, only a complete resignation from the purposeful influence creates 
conditions for the true acceptance of the subjectivity of a pupil. Each educational 
situation appears to be a meeting of two inauthentic subjects, which, by creat-
ing an ostensible world, conceal their true feelings and thoughts from each 
other.16 While antipedagogy has to be given credit for exhibiting the pupil’s 
subjectivity, which was considered a violation of pedagogical principles, it is 
difficult to accept that its followers perceive the purpose-oriented education 
as a deception aiming at gaining dominance over pupils, their indoctrination, 
in order to achieve different goals, even the noble ones.17 Despite the fact that 
the influence of antipedagogy is presently decreasing, the importance of subjec-
tivity, propagated by its supporters, still remains attractive and relevant. It has 
found its new place and perspectives primarily within personalism, which, 
by attaching significance to the subjectivity of pupils in the educational process, 
does not only acknowledge its purposeful character but regards it as something 
of paramount importance.
4. Understanding man in the context  
of the assumptions of personalism
The starting point for personalism, which is a complex philosophical-theological 
school of thought, characterized by strong pedagogical implications, is the 
phenomenon of the person through which the entire reality is interpreted.18 
While analyzing the nature of the person, and not relinquishing the possibility 
to fathom it, personalism indicates mystery as its strong element. Following 
C. Bartnik, we may see the person as a complex being since it combines two as-
pects: on the one hand, it is “someone existing”, and, on the other hand, unique-
ness “existing as someone”. The person is a real being that is most deserving 
of existence, which is concentrated on the self, i.e. that it is “someone”.19 Also 
 16 Cf. B. Śliwerski, Antypedagogika, in: Wyzwania pedagogii krytycznej i antypedagogiki, 
eds. B. Śliwerski, T. Szkudlarek, Kraków 1991, p. 124.
 17 Cf. S. Gałkowski, Założenia, implikacje i konsekwencje antypedagogiki, in: W świecie 
dziecka, eds. B. Lachowska, M. Rygielski, Lublin 1999, p. 26.
 18 Cf. K. Bochenek, Bezpieczeństwo osoby a demokracja w kontekście personalizmu Jana 
Pawła II, in: Prawo i państwo. Wybrane zagadnienia, eds. D. Stasi, M. Bosak, Rzeszów 2014, 
p. 162.
 19 Cf. C.S. Bartnik, Szkice do systemu personalizmu, Lublin 2006, pp. 22-23.
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K. Wojtyła, formulating his personalistic norm, differentiates between its two 
aspects. In its negative part, in a way, parallell to Kant, the person is the kind 
of good which cannot be treated as an object of use, and thus, as such the means 
to an end. In its positive form, however, going further than Kant’s formalism, 
the personalistic norm indicates that the person is a good towards which the 
only proper and adequate attitude is love.20
The core of personalism is defined by integral anthropology, which takes 
into account all aspects of human nature.21 Owing to the physical body, man 
is seen here as an individual, and a specimen of the human species, and identi-
fied as a person thanks to the internal, spiritual “I”, the internal parameter that 
absolutely dissociates itself from accounts disregarding any aspect of human 
corporeality. By not formulating a systematic and uniform ideology, personal-
ism regards the person as the fundamental human reality, preceding economic, 
social and political structures. Furthermore, this reality is sensitive to high values 
and capable of autonomy from things.22 At the core of the social, personalistic 
philosophy lies a reference to the common good, which includes and reflects the 
good of each and every person. The correlation of freedom and responsibility 
implies a significant need to limit it; the border, however, is defined by the good 
of other persons, gifted the same dignity.23
Every person’s dignity is perceived by personalism as an innate and natural 
hallmark that assigns the person a special place in the hierarchy of beings. Per-
sonalism demands affirmation and protection of dignity, free of exclusivism.24 
The consequence of dignity and the autotelic quality of the human person is ac-
 20 Cf. K. Wojtyła, Miłość i odpowiedzialność, Kraków 1986, p. 42.
 21 Cf. J.  Stala, Den Jungen Menschen auf den Etappen Seines Lebenswegs Begleiten. 
Wesentliche Elemente der Jugendkatechese Johannes Pauls II., „Angelicum“ 90 (2013), pp. 
945-960; J. Stala, Die Freiheit – das besondere Kennzeichen einer modernen Jugenderziehung, 
„The Person and the Challenges” 3 (2013) Nr 2, pp. 193-207; J. Stala, Der gesellschaftlich-
kulturelle Kontext der aktuellen Gefährdungen für die religiöse Erziehung und Bildung in der 
Familie, „The Person and the Challenges” 3 (2013) Nr 1, pp. 251-266; J. Stala, Implikationen 
für Pädagogik und Katechese im Hinblick auf die Unterstützung christlicher Eltern bei der 
Erfüllung ihrer Aufgaben im Kontext der aktuellen Bedrohungen und Herausforderungen der 
Familie, „Theologica” 48 (2013) 1, pp. 129-142.
 22 Cf. J. Maritain, Pisma filozoficzne, Kraków 1988, p. 139; S. Kowalczyk, Polski personalizm 
współczesny, in: Personalizm polski, ed. M. Rusecki, Lublin 2008, p. 315.
 23 Cf. K. Wojtyła, Osoba i czyn, Kraków 1969, pp. 355-357.
 24 Cf. J. Galarowicz, Być ziarnem pszenicznym. Nowa książeczka o człowieku, Kęty 2006, 
p. 148.
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knowledging that it cannot be treated as a means but only as an end before any 
other person, including God. In the case of God, this situation, even though 
such philosophers as Sartre put independence from God at the core of their 
doctrine, seems impossible since He exists as Love, which rules out dominance 
or enslavement.25 Thus, G. Marcel rejects the opinion that philosophy ought 
to be characterized as being impervious to any form of supernaturalism,26 and 
V. Frankl points out that in order to fully explain the essence of man, it is indis-
pensable to refer to anthropology, which, by challenging nihilism, leaves the 
door open for transcendence.27 According to this philosopher, the essence of this 
nihilism lies in its reductionistic, disregarding relations of the human person 
with God, view of the reality and, consequently, in discounting these dimensions 
of existence that conceal its greatest wealth.28 Having rejected the thesis that 
the relation of man and God deprives man of subjectivity, Maritain writes that 
only when God sets out the perspective of looking at the whole reality can man 
know that “my person has no meaning and, at the same time, my fate is the most 
important of them all – to know one thing without falling into hubris, to know 
the other without revealing our uniqueness.” 29 The same argumentation and 
thoughts are exhibited by J. Życiński, who postulates replacing the ostensible 
opposition between God and Man with a harmonious symphony between them, 
leading towards Beauty and a Sense of humanity.30 This striving after synergy 
between human nature and that which results from transcendence constitutes 
the factor which shapes, in great part, the personalistic model of education.
5. Education as a process of personalization
Personalization, proposed by the presented model of understanding man, does 
not mean a person’s withdrawal into oneself, but it is entails going beyond oneself 
towards a community, being with others and for others, building interpersonal 
 25 Cf. T. Klein, Jana Pawła II odczytanie biblijnego przesłania o Bożym miłosierdziu, Pelplin 
2008, p. 161.
 26 Cf. G. Marcel, Homo viator, Warszawa 1959, p. 271.
 27 Cf. V. Frankl, Homo patiens, Warszawa 1971, p. 94.
 28 Cf. V. Frankl, Homo patiens, Warszawa 1971, pp. 9-10, 107.
 29 Cf. J. Maritain, Bóg i nauka, in: Pisma filozoficzne, Kraków 1988, p. 91.
 30 Cf. J. Życiński, Medytacje sokratejskie, Lublin 1991, p. 161.
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relations.31 In spite of the fact that every person remains a closed-up unity, there 
occurs a parallel, dynamic process of fulfilling its potentiality. Thus, an absolute 
condition for “becoming” a person is the participation of other persons, open-
ing to them and, as a result, to education. The human person, while remaining 
an autonomous and creative subject, which ultimately determines itself, cannot 
develop in isolation from other persons since achieving one’s complete human-
ity occurs only by being with others. The process of “personalization” can never 
violate the individuality and subjectivity of the educated person since its goal 
is to develop this individuality and subjectivity. Following the classical Aris-
totelian-Thomistic philosophy, personalism equates education of a pupil with 
their “enhancement” so that they can finally take responsibility for the process 
of development of their potentialities. The consequence of acknowledging the 
uniqueness of every person is granting them the right to select their own separate 
way of personal development and enhancement. A person is educated, whereas 
an animal may only be trained.32 The dynamic structure of self-determination 
means that a person is gifted and assigned to oneself, belongs to oneself and 
is responsible for oneself.33 The responsibility for self-determination transforms 
into the obligation to striving towards the full personal life, with the entire 
wealth of factors constituting it.
The personalistic vision of education, focused primarily on the development 
of the human person, obliges them to gifting humanity to each other, as well 
as to a dialog between free persons, premised on their subjectivity and includ-
ing their mentality.34 A condition for the effectiveness of this process is the 
personal maturity of the educator, who, oneself aiming at self-enhancement, will 
be able to choose appropriate values together with their pupil.35 The recognition 
of values by young people cannot be achieved without the model example of the 
educator, who remains their undisputed, but not imposed, a priori master.36 The 
power of this respect, besides the acquired knowledge and pedagogical compe-
 31 Cf. J. Bielski, Wychowanie i edukacja w personalizmie, in: Dylematy współczesnej edukacji, 
ed. K. Dziurzyński, Józefów 2012, p. 33.
 32 K. Wojtyła, Miłość i odpowiedzialność, Kraków 1986, p. 54.
 33 Cf. G. Grzybek, Etyka rozwoju a pedagogika opiekuńcza, Rzeszów 2013, p. 32.
 34 Cf. G. Puchalski, Edukacja w kontekście nowej ewangelizacji w nauczaniu Jana Pawła II, 
Olsztyn 2002, p. 151.
 35 Cf. K. Wojtyła, Osoba i czyn, Kraków 1969, p. 233.
 36 Cf. S. Kowalczyk, Współczesny kryzys ideowo-aksjologiczny, Lublin 2011, p. 41.
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tences, can be measured only as something that can only be described as “love”. 
Following John Paul II, the genesis of this special kind of love is to be found in the 
essence of youth itself: “It is enough that you are young for me to love you.”37 
Only the deep, not superficial, affirmation of the educated young individuals 
creates conditions for revealing the vast perspectives of personal existence before 
them, and, at the same time, it genuinely respects their subjectivity. According 
to the Polish Pope, the dogmatic, but also hopeful parable of the prodigal son 
and loving father, who never, even for a moment, discounted his son’s dignity 
as a person, can be regarded as a summary of Christian pedagogy, which follows 
personalism. “The father of the prodigal son is faithful to his fatherhood, faithful 
to his love that he bestowed upon his son…The father is cognizant of the fact 
the principal good: good of humanity of his son, has been saved. Admittedly, the 
fortune has been wasted, but the humanity has survived.38 This concern for the 
core of humanity of the son does not stand in opposition to acknowledging his 
subjectivity. The son’s choice of values that are not cherished by his father, even 
if it was inappropriate in his view, does not sever the father-son bond. At the 
core of the father’s concern there is undying hope for his son’s return and re-
adopting values that are important to the father.
Within personalism and education based on it, the factor that shapes the 
person tremendously, as well as being the central feature of social life, is the 
conveyance of values. Education founded on anti-values is, in itself, a logical 
and moral contradiction. On the other hand, education that refrains from any 
values, must, according to personalism, be regarded as simply in vain and un-
productive. The role of personalistic education is not by any means to destroy 
subjectivity of young people but rather to support the process of preference and 
affirmation of the appropriate hierarchy of values by them, without which their 
fullness of humanity cannot come into being. The building of the axiosphere, 
within which an effective process of education would be shaped, ought to be 
based on factors defining the person: dignity, responsibility, reason, freedom, 
love, ability of transcendence. The process of education towards values is a meet-
ing of the subject persons: child, adolescent, teacher, parent, who, driven by the 
similar axiological orientation, orient themselves on the genuine growth of the 
person.
 37 Jan Paweł II, Letter Juvenum Patris on the centenary of death of St. John Bosco, Vatican 
1988, No. 4.
 38 Cf. Jan Paweł II, Dives in Misercordia Encyclical, Vatican 1980, No. 6, 7.
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6. Conclusion
Living on the border of two different worlds: natural and specifically human, 
man seems to be a being that is dramatically torn in search of his true identity.39 
At the same time, man can never abandon this quest, even if it seems like the 
mythical Sisyphean task. Man cannot withdraw from this path, even if he seems 
to be the only being that is never going to be given sufficient time to learn how 
to live. “An ant that hatches out knows all it can do and will never err; a bird 
leaving its nest is a mature bird; but an old man dies crying that he has never 
understood his true calling”.40 Comprehension of this calling, but, above all, 
fulfilling it, is the task of every person, who, in a way, permanently constitutes 
both the object and the subject of education.
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